There’s a saying that you shouldn’t shop for groceries when you’re hungry. The political equivalent of this dictum is that you shouldn’t change the Constitution when you’re angry. Practically everyone is angry with the Senate at the moment and there are calls to abolish this institution, something that will require a onstitutional amendment.
There seems to be declining support for reforming the beleaguered institution. Admittedly, the Senate has not performed its primary role of scrutinizing legislation particularly well lately — nor has it done any better at representing Canada’s regions.
The problem with the first function is, in part, that bills come to them is a big whoosh at the end of a session leaving little time for the scrutiny they require.
But since the Senate typically divides along party lines, additional time would in all likelihood not make much difference.
Provincial premiers are effective advocates for their provinces, thus making senators redundant. So it seems that opponents are correct in advocating abolition of an institution that seems to do nothing useful.
However, it may be that we’re looking at this issue from the wrong end of the telescope.
No doubt the Senate is dysfunctional but those advocating its abolition should be careful what they wish for. A unicameral legislature with the dangerous combination of our Westminster-style parliamentary system, the first-past-the-post electoral system and the growing power of the Prime Minister would create the conditions for a perfect storm.
The result might well be much more serious than the Senate’s detractors realize.
Parliamentary system
The parliamentary system offers carte blanche to a majority government, making it incredibly effective and nearly impossible to derail. This winner-takes-all situation provides no incentive for the executive to compromise or to incorporate even the most sensible amendments from across the aisle. Thus even nominal scrutiny by the upper house is preferable to the untramelled power of a majority government.
Electoral system
We usually accept that a government with a legislative majority has a mandate to govern as it pleases. However, the strength of the mandate is often questionable because our method of electing MPs. It reflects voter preferences poorly, conferring a majority of seats on a party even when most people (in total) have voted for opposition parties. The current government received a majority of seats even though 60 per cent of Canadian voted for other parties. In some instances, a single opposition party wins a greater share of the vote than the winning party. This happened in the British Columbia election in 1996.
Power of the prime minister
The phrase “unelected senators/judges” is very emotive, conjuring up visions of power-hungry individuals determined to usurp the role of democratically-elected officials. But this rosy view needs a reality check as to the role MPs actually play in drafting legislation.
The role they play has evolved to the extent that sadly, due to rigorous party discipline, critics now describe legislators as ciphers who vote on bills as they are instructed to. To regard them as a group that has much input into the legislative process would therefore be inaccurate. It is the prime minister and cabinet who have the greatest say in drafting legislation but in recent years even cabinet’s role has diminished.
For decades, there has been debate about the concentration of power in the prime minister’s hands. Academics have expressed concern that our parliamentary system is moving closer the U.S. presidential model. However, this has evolved without the checks and balances provided by Congress and its power to impeach the President.
A recent study of 27 parliamentary systems placed Canada at the top in terms of the amount of power exercised by the Prime Minister. Political scientist Peter Russell has commented that the unelected Prime Minister’s Office has undermined cabinet/parliamentary government. Not only is transparency and accountability absent in this agency but the hand-picked staff are highly partisan.
Our version of the parliamentary system is grounded in a set of conventions that have been established over hundreds of years. Conventions are not legally binding, so a determined prime minister can simply ignore them. One such convention is that the government should resign if it loses a vote of confidence. Although this convention has not been flouted in Canada, we were arguably close to it when Parliament was prorogued on the eve of a vote of confidence.
In this instance, the Governor General granted the PM’s request, even though she could have refused to do so thereby forcing the government’s fate to be decided in the House of Commons. Technically, it is the job of the Governor General to ensure that the government adheres to the constitution at all times. However, as an appointed official, s/he is reluctant to exercise such powers just as Senators feel they lack the legitimacy to be too zealous in their scrutiny of bills.
I would suggest that if we do eliminate the upper house, we will have to think very carefully about developing mechanisms to check the overwhelming power of the prime minister. To safeguard democracy it would be advisable for Canadians to calm down and consider whether a feeble upper house is better than the possibility of a prime minister running amok.
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